We o er an alternative framework for the analysis of mutual funds and use it to examine the rationale behind existing regulations that require mutual fund adviser fees to be of the fulcrum" variety. W e nd little justi cation for the regulations. Indeed, we nd that asymmetric incentive fees" in which the adviser receives a at fee plus a bonus for exceeding a benchmark index provide Pareto-dominant outcomes with a lower level of equilibrium volatility.
Introduction
Permissible fee structures in the US mutual fund industry are laid out in the 1970 Amendment to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The Act, which is reviewed in Appendix A, allows mutual funds and their investment advisers to enter into performance-based compensation contracts only if the fees are of the fulcrum" variety, that is, ones in which the adviser's fee is symmetric around a chosen index, decreasing for underperforming the index in the same way in which it increases for outperforming it. Thus, while the Act does not rule out fraction of funds" fees in which advisers are paid a xed percentage of the total funds under management, it does prohibit so-called incentive fee" contracts in which advisers receive a base fee plus a bonus for exceeding a benchmark index. 1 The rationale o ered for the prohibition of incentive fee contracts is theoretical rather than empirical in nature; that is, the ban has more to do with concerns about the inherent nature of incentive-fee contracts, rather than any actual evidence of abuse. Supporters of the prohibition, both in the SEC and in Congress, have argued that a fee structure which rewards advisers for outperforming a benchmark index without penalizing them for underperforming it provides advisers with an incentive to take excessive risk. E ectively so the argument goes, such advisers hold an option that gives them the right t o e x c hange a fraction of their portfolio for the benchmark portfolio. The value of this option can be increased by increasing the spread between the standard deviations of the two portfolios, leading to the concern about increased risk.
A little re ection suggests that this line of reasoning is incomplete. By linking choices of risk levels solely to fee structures, it implicitly i n v okes a partial equilibrium" assumption that investors are passive and will not change their portfolio allocations in reaction to the altered environment. If, however, investors are active and choose portfolio allocations as optimal responses to fee structures and fund risk levels, it is not obvious that admitting incentive fee structures will lead to increased levels of risk in equilibrium.
Indeed, once we m o v e a w a y from the partial equilibrium framework and explicitly model investor reactions, it becomes apparent that equilibrium risk levels are not the only|or even the primary|quantity with which w e should be concerned. Since the objective of the legislation is to protect investors, the relevant question should be: does the prohibition of incentive fees lead to an increase in investor welfare? The answer is not immediate. Certainly, it is not apparent that admitting incentive fees will necessarily make the investor worse o . This paper examines, in an equilibrium model, the extent to which the prohibition on incentive fees can be justi ed at a theoretical level. We nd that the regulatory concern may be misplaced: we describe a set of robust models in which incentive fee structures dominate fulcrum fee structures on all fronts, providing Pareto-superior outcomes with lower equilibrium volatility levels. The two subsections immediately following discuss special features of the framework we employ and provide a more detailed description of our main results. A review of the related literature follows in Section 2.
Comments on Our Framework
A central question facing the modeller in constructing a useful framework for analysis of mutual funds is: who makes the decision on the choice of contract form? Following the lead of the vast literature on principal agent problems, the majority of papers in the literature on mutual fund compensation have assumed that this power rests with the principal i.e., the investor in his role as fund shareholder. Our model breaks with this tradition. We make no distinction between the fund and its investment advisers, and assign the decision on fee structure to the fund. Two considerations guide our choice in this matter. First, while an assumption that investors choose compensation structures may be apposite in dealing with the relationship between a large client and an investment adviser, it is, perhaps, a little less suitable in the context of mutual funds. In principle, a mutual fund is controlled by its shareholders and, indeed, is required to have outsiders" comprise at least 40 of its board. In practice, nonetheless, the relationship between a fund and its advisers tends to be extremely close. Indeed, most management companies are responsible for establishing the funds that they advise. It appears appropriate, therefore, to explore the consequences of allowing the adviser to choose not only the risk-characteristics of the fund portfolio, but also its fee structure.
Second, our decision to have the fund's investment advisers choose the fee structure is especially appropriate from the narrow point of view of the questions motivating this paper. Indeed, if we w ere to adopt the standard paradigm and have the investor in his role as principal choose the form of the compensation contract, restricting the set of permissible contracts could end up lowering investor welfare, but certainly can never increase it. On the other hand, it makes perfect sense to ask as we do whether restrictions on the fund's ability to set fees can enhance investor welfare.
Our model also di ers from the standard principal agent approach in not taking the amount i n v ested in the fund as exogeneous. Rather, investors in our model choose portfolio allocations as optimal responses to funds' choice of risk levels and fee structures. Endogeneizing investment c hoices and solving for it as part of the equilibrium appears to us to be an important consideration. Among other things, it captures the point that fee structures and risk characteristics of the fund portfolio are not chosen in isolation, but in a competitive environment for the investment dollar.
Also in contrast to much of the existing literature, our model makes explicit and central use of a benchmark" portfolio. Since mutual funds are restricted by l a w to using fulcrum fees and a fulcrum fee cannot be meaningfully de ned without reference to a benchmark, it appears that benchmarking should be an important ingredient in a study of mutual fund fee structures. 2 The use of a benchmark introduces a complication that is not present i n t ypical principal-agent models: for each action available to the fund investment adviser, the model must now specify not only a distribution of returns on the fund portfolio, but also the relationship between this distribution and that of the benchmark returns.
Finally, one aspect of our model merits further comment. As the description provided above suggests, our model may be thought of as a principal agent model in which, in addition to the usual considerations, the agent c hooses the fee structure, and the principal responds by c hoosing the amount of resources to be invested with the agent. To our knowledge, such a framework has not been investigated in the literature. It appears to us that it may b e useful in analyzing compensation structures in a variety of other settings as well.
Main Results
Our analysis begins in Section 3 with a simple two security framework in which the intuition underlying our results is easily captured. Sections 4 and 5 enrich this framework in two directions: by allowing for fund e ort" to enhance return distributions and by allowing for multiple risky securities. In each case, we c haracterize the equilbrium solutions rst when the fund is restricted to using only fulcrum fees, and then when it may use only incentive fees. A comparison of the equilibria under the two regimes reveals that, in each case, incentive fees dominate fulcrum fees on all fronts: a the equilibrium utility levels of the fund and the investor are both higher under an incentive fee structure than a fulcrum fee structure; and b the volatility of net-of-fees returns to the investor is lower under incentive fees than under fulcrum fees.
These results may not appear entirely intuitive. Ceteris paribus, for instance, risk-averse investors such as those in our model would prefer fulcrum fees since this would lower their returns' variance. Thus, one may expect investors to fare better in equilibrium under a 2 The existence of fee regulations and, therefore, benchmarking may play a role in explaining di erences in fee structures across the asset management industry as well. For example, mutual funds overwhelmingly tend to use at fees with no performance-adjustment component see Appendix B. However, hedge funds, which are not subject to the fulcrum-fee requirement, typically employ incentive fees with a substantial performance component. To our knowledge, no paper has attempted to examine the di erences in existing fee structures from such a perspective. fulcrum fee regime although the fund may still prefer incentive fees. In fact, our results derive in most part from risk-sharing arguments. Since investors in our model react adversely to increases in the level of fees or of portfolio risk, selecting a mix that maximizes total fees is a delicate task. The symmetric nature of fulcrum fees makes them relatively in exible in this direction, while incentive fees, with their asymmetric patterns enable better risk-sharing between the investor and the fund. We elaborate further on the intuitive underpinnings of our results in Section 3.5.
Our model also o ers some insights into the fee structures commonly found in mutual funds and hedge funds. In the mutual fund industry, the overwhelming fee of choice is a at fraction-of-funds fee with no explicit performance-adjustment component see Appendix B for more details. In hedge funds, which are not subject to the fulcrum fee requirement and which tend to use leveraged strategies, the most popular fee structure is an incentive fee with a large performance component. These are exactly the equilibrium fee structures that are predicted by our model. In the absence of leveraging, we nd that the equilibrium fulcrum fee is always a at fee with no performance component. When incentive fees are allowed and leveraging is permitted, we nd that the equilibrium fee is an incentive fee with a large performance component. The intuitive arguments underlying these results again derive from risk-sharing considerations and are discussed further in Section 3.5.
The Related Literature
This section provides a brief discussion of the theoretical literature on compensation structures in the mutual fund industry. The presentation here is meant to be indicative of the work that has been done in this area and not as a survey of the eld.
Broadly speaking, there are two branches to the literature on mutual fund compensation. On the one hand are the papers that take a partial equilibrium approach and examine the reaction of managers to a ceteris paribus change in the fee structure. On the other hand are the papers that adopt a full" equilibrium approach, solving for compensation structures as part of an equilibrium. Papers falling into the rst group include Davanzo and Nesbit 3 , Ferguson and Lestikow 4 , Grinblatt and Titman 7 , Grinold and Rudd 8 , and Kritzman 11 . Those falling into the second group include Heinkel and Stoughton 9 , Huddart 10 , and Lynch and Musto 14 . Finally, there is the recent paper of Admati and P eiderer 1 which combines aspects of both approaches. We discuss some of these papers in more detail below.
Of the rst category of papers, the most comprehensive analysis is carried out in Grinblatt and Titman 7 . Grinblatt and Titman assume that managers can risklessly capture the value of any options implicit in their payo structure by hedging in their personal portfolios. This enables the use of results from option pricing theory in characterizing the optimal i.e., fee maximizing level of risk for any given contract structure. Among other things, Grinblatt and Titman show that for certain classes of portfolio strategies, adverse risk-sharing incentives are avoided when the penalties for poor performance outweigh the rewards for good performance.
Heinkel and Stoughton 9 aim to explain the predominance of fraction-of-funds fee arrangements in the asset-management industry including, but not only, m utual funds. They employ a t w o-period model with heterogeneous types of managers, in which moral hazard is also present. Under some assumptions, the authors show that the optimal initial set of contracts features a smaller performance-based fee in the rst period than in a rst-best contract. They suggest that this reduced emphasis on the performance component i n t h e rst period is analogous to the lack of a performance-based fee in many parts of the assetmanagement industry. Huddart 10 builds on the Heinkel-Stoughton model by dropping the assumption that managers are risk-neutral, and by i n troducing competing fund managers. He examines the problem in which the investor must decide which fund to invest in under the assumption that fees are exogeneously xed at some proportion of assets under management. However, Huddart does show that the adoption of a performance fee can mitigate undesirable reputation e ects and result in investors being ex-ante better o .
Lynch and Musto 14 aim to explain the fee-structures commonly found in mutual funds and hedge funds. They employ a moral hazard model in which the manager's e ort is observable by the investor, but is not contractable i.e., cannot be used as legal evidence. The manager commits to an e ort level; observing this, the investor then decides on the amount of money to be invested in the fund. Lynch and Musto identify conditions in this model in which di erent fee structures predominate.
Our objectives evidently di er from those of Heinkel and Stoughton 9 and Lynch and Musto 14 . Our model is also di erent i n s e v eral respects. For example, the choice of fee structure in our model is made exclusively with the fund investment adviser. Secondly, i n contrast to both papers, our model involves the central use of a benchmark" portfolio; as we h a v e already mentioned, we regard this as an important part of our approach. However, unlike Heinkel and Stoughton 9 , our model is a static one and does not involve adverse selection considerations.
Admati and P eiderer 1 consider a scenario where the fund manager has superior information to the investor and faces a fulcrum fee structure. Their aim is to examine whether there are any conditions under which the manager would pick the investor's most desired portfolio i.e., the portfolio that the investor would have c hosen had he been possessed of the same information as the manager. There are super cial similarities b e t w een this question and that motivating our paper, but there are some fundamental di erences in the analyses. First, the issue studied by Admati and P eiderer is the desirability of benchmarking within a fulcrum fee structure; they do not, for instance, consider incentive fee structures. We, on the other hand, take benchmarking as a given, and compare the e ects of di erent fee structures on equilibrium payo s. Second, Admati and P eiderer are not explicitly concerned with determining equilibrium fee structures and portfolio allocations. Thus, for example, they take the amount i n v ested with the manager as exogeneous; they also compute the investor's most desired portfolio by using gross returns rather than returns net of the manager's fees. Finally, the presence of asymmetric information is central to the Admati P eiderer paper, while our paper, as mentioned above, involves a symmetric information setting.
The empirical literature on the impact of di erent fee structures on fund performance and equilibrium risk levels is somewhat limited. Baumol, et al 2 and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 12 have each documented the prevailing payo structures and the extent o f v ariation in these structures. There have also been a few direct econometric studies of the performance-fee issue, including Golec 5 , Golec 6 , and Lin 13 . All three of these studies nd that fulcrum fees are typically used only by large well-capitalized rms, and, more importantly, that funds with fulcrum fees on average outperform those without such fees. However, while Golec 5 nds a signi cant performance di erential, Lin 13 does not.
The Model
There are two players in our model, an investor and a fund. The investor, a representative stand-in for a large number of identical investors, has an initial wealth of w 0. The investor's objective i s t o c hoose an allocation of this amount b e t w een a riskless asset and the fund 3 so as to maximize his utility U e w T from his wealth e w T at the end of the model's single period. 4 We assume throughout that U has a mean-variance form: U e w T = E e w T , 1 2 Ve w T ; 3.1
where E e w T and V e w T denote, respectively, the expectation and variance of e w T , and 0 is a parameter signifying the investor's aversion to variance. We also assume that the amount x invested in the fund must be non-negative, i.e., that the investor cannot short the fund.
The net return on the riskless asset is normalized to zero throughout the paper. The return to the investor from the fund depends on two factors: the fee structure adopted by the fund which determines the after-fees returns to the investor, and the return characteristics of the fund portfolio. The investor takes both of these factors as given in determining his portfolio allocation; we discuss each factor in more detail below.
Fees
The fees charged by the fund may depend on the realized returns r p on the fund portfolio, as well as on the realized returns r b on a target" or benchmark" portfolio. 5 The fees, denoted Fr p ; r b , are received at the end of the period, and are stated as fees per dollar invested in the fund. Thus, if the amount i n v ested in the fund is x, the dollar fees received by the fund are x Fr p ; r b , and the amount received by the investor is x r p , Fr p ; r b .
Return Distributions
The return characteristics of the fund portfolio depend on the fund's action a. Let e r p a denote the returns per dollar invested in the fund portfolio given a. Throughout the paper, returns are stated in gross terms, i.e., as one plus the net return.
The description of the returns distributions must encompass two aspects: i for each action a, the relationship between the returns on the fund portfolio e r p a and the benchmark portfolio e r b , and ii the distribution for the benchmark returns e r b . Concering the former, we adopt in this section the setting of Grinblatt and Titman 7 and take the action a to denote the fraction of initial asset value invested in the benchmark portfolio, with the remainder invested at the riskless rate. Thus, the returns e r p a on the fund portfolio under the action a are given by e r p a = a e r b + 1 , a :
This speci cation of the fund portfolio returns is, of course, a simple one. In Sections 4 and 5, we enrich i t i n t w o directions: by allowing for fund e ort" to improve return distributions and by allowing for multiple risky securities. For two important reasons, nonethless, it makes sense to begin with the model 3.2. First, the intuitive arguments underlying the results of our paper are transparent in this simple framework see Section 3.5. Second, we are able to obtain closed-form solutions for equilibrium strategies in this setting to con rm the intuitive arguments; this is di cult in the more complex settings of Sections 4 and 5. Observe that x depends on the choice of action a taken by the fund as well as the fee structure F it adopts, through the dependence of Y on these quantities. When necessary, we shall write x a; F to emphasize this. The fund is assumed to be risk-neutral. 8 Give n a c hoice of a; F, the expected fee EF received by the fund is given by
3.7
The fund picks a and its fee structure F so as to maximize this expected fee. These optimal choices determine the equilibrium payo s to the two players. Before proceeding, we should note here the change in perspective here from the usual principal agent framework. In the latter, the investor in his role as principal plays the role of the large player" i.e., the Stackelberg leader and maximizes his payo s taking into account the reactions of the agent the investment adviser. In our model, the fund investment adviser is the Stackelberg leader and maximizes its payo s taking into account the investor's reactions. 9 We note also that unlike the standard approach, there is no exogeneously speci ed reservation utility criterion that must be met. In a sense, this role is played in our model by the alternative i n v estment opportunity a v ailable to the investor, but the analogy is not quite perfect. In a principal agent model, the agent t ypically receives his reservation utility i n equilibrium, while we show that the investor in our model receives strictly higher expected utility in equilibrium than he could obtain by i n v esting all his funds in the riskless asset.
Fee Structures of Special Interest
There are two fee structures of special importance for the material that follows. The rst, the so-called fulcrum fees, h a v e the property that the fees per dollar invested in the fund are symmetric in the fund's performance relative to the benchmark: they increase for outperforming the benchmark in the same way that they decrease for underperforming it. We consider only linear fulcrum fees; these are by far the most common types used in practice. Such fees are described by Fr p ; r b = b 1 r p + b 2 r p , r b ;
3.8 where b 1 and b 2 are non-negative constants denoting, respectively, the base fee and the performance adjustment component. When b 2 = 0, the fees are simply a constant fraction b 1 of the total returns r p ; such fees are called at fees" or fraction-of-funds" fees.
In practice, when fulcrum fees are employed, it is almost invariably the case that a oor and, by the symmetry requirement, a corresponding cap are placed on the size of the performance adjustment component see Appendix B. We adopt such a restriction; to simplify notation, we use zero as the oor value, and require that the realized fees F always be non-negative. The oor of zero implies, by symmetry, a cap of 2b 1 r p for fees, and so our nal form for fulcrum fees is:
Fr p ; r b = maxf0; minfb 1 r p + b 2 r p , r b ; 2b 1 r p gg:
The second class of fees of importance are asymmetric incentive fees. Like fulcrum fees, incentive fees are described by t w o parameters b 1 and b 2 , with b 1 denoting the base fee level, and b 2 the performance adjustment component. However, unlike fulcrum fees, the performance adjustment component m ust remain non-negative, and the total fee is given by F = b 1 r p + b 2 maxfr p , r b ; 0g:
3.10
In the analysis that follows, we compare equilibrium outcomes under three settings: when the fund is limited to using only fulcrum fees, when it is limited to using only incentive fees, and when it is unrestricted in its fee choices. Our decision to compare the outcomes under a fulcrum fee regime to not just the unrestricted model, but also to a restricted model in which only incentive fees are used is based on two considerations. First, the existing legislation on mutual fund fees is motivated explicitly by fear of the consequences of incentive fee structures. Second, from a practical standpoint, incentive fee structures are commonly used in relationships between investors and investment advisers where they are legal e.g., in hedge funds. In contrast, as is well known, unrestricted equilibrium contracts in principal agent models often take on unrealistically complex and unintuitive forms. Consequently, w e view the unrestricted fee structures more as an idealized benchmark, than as a feasible alternative. Nonetheless, the properties of the unrestricted fees in equilibrium are of considerable use in understanding the intuitive underpinnings of our results, as we explain in Section 3.5.
Equilibrium under Fulcrum Fees
Given the fund's choice of b 1 ; b 2 and its portfolio choice a, a little algebra shows that the fees F h ; F m ; F l received by the rm in the three states are given by F h = maxf0; minf2b 1 1 + h a; b 1 + b 2 h a ,1gg
Using this together with 3.5, the net-of-fees return distribution to the investor may b e computed for any c hoice of b 1 ; b 2 ; a . In principle, solving for the equilibrium is now a straightforward process. Using the distribution of net-of-fees returns, we can identify, via 3.6, the optimal x for the investor as a function of a; b 1 ; b 2 . Then, we use this optimal choice and expression 3.11 for the fees to obtain the expected fee in terms of a; b 1 ; b 2 . Maximizing this expected fee then yields the optimal choices of a; b 1 ; b 2 , and thereby the players' equilibrium payo s.
In practice, because a max is unspeci ed, the last step is tricky. We use, therefore, a two-step procedure. First, we hold the portfolio choice a xed at some arbitrary level, and identify the equilibrium payo s for the fund and the investor for this xed a. Then, for any possible value of a max , w e identify the value of a 2 0; a max that maximizes the fund's equilibrium payo s.
The following proposition summarizes equilibrium outcomes when a is held xed. It may also be of some independent i n terest insofar as it relates equilibrium fee structures to the ability to leverage. Proposition 3.1 For xed a, the equilibrium fulcrum fee structure is as follows:
1. If a 1, then the equilibrium fulcrum fee c ontract is a at fee c ontract, i.e., we have b 1 0 and b 2 = 0 . A closed-form expression for b 1 is given by C.7 in Appendix C.1. Proof See Appendix C.1.
An intuitive explanation of all the results of this section is provided in Subsection 3.5. Using the equilibrium values of b 1 ; b 2 , we can derive closed-form expressions for the investor's equilibrium expected utility and the fund's equilibrium expected fees for a xed value of a. Letting Observe that the investor's equilibrium payo s do not depend on a in any w a y . Some simple calculation also reveals that the fund's equilibrium payo s are strictly increasing in a for both a 1 a s w ell as for a 1. Moreover, a comparison between the equilibrium expected fee when a 1 and a 1 reveals that the latter is always strictly larger. It follows immediately that Proposition 3.2 In a fulcrum fee r e gime, the optimal portfolio choice for the fund is always a = a max .
1. If a max 1, the equilibrium fee is a at fee with b 1 given by C.7. The investor's expected utility level and the fund's expected f e es in equilibrium are given by 3.12 and 3.13, respectively.
2. If a max 1, the equilibrium fee structure is given by C.20 C.21. The investor's expected utility level and the fund's expected f e es in equilibrium are given by 3.14 and 3.15, respectively.
Proof See Appendix C.2.
Equilibrium under Incentive F ees
Under incentive fees, the fund picks a base fee b 1 and a performance-dependent fee b 2 . Given the action a, the fee to the fund is F = b 1 e r p a + b 2 maxf0; e r p a , e r b g:
Using the expressions 3.3 and 3.4 for the benchmark and fund portfolio returns, respectively, w e can see that whether the fund portfolio outperforms the benchmark portfolio in a particular state depends on the level of a. I f a 1, then the fund's fees are distributed as
On the other hand, if a 1, then the fund's fees are distributed as
The net-of-fees returns to the investor may be obtained from these fees using expression 3.5. To identify the equilibrium, w e proceed now as in the fulcrum fee case. We use the distribution of net-of-fees returns to identify the optimal amount i n v ested in the fund for each a; b 1 ; b 2 . Using this, we solve for the optimal a; b 1 ; b 2 b y rst identifying equilibrium payo s for a xed a, and then solving for the optimal a. The following result describes the equilibrium fee structure for each xed a: Proposition 3.3 For xed a, the equilibrium incentive fee structure is as follows:
1. When a 1, the equilibrium incentive fee c ontract is a at-fee c ontract with b 1 0 and b 2 = 0 . The base fee b 1 is the same as in the fulcrum-fee c ase, and is given by expression C.7 in Appendix C.1.
2. When a 1 , the equilibrium incentive fee c ontract is a pure p erformance f e e, i.e., b 1 = 0 and b 2 0. A closed-form expression for b 2 is given by C.25 in Appendix C.3.
These fee structures may be used to solve for the equilibrium payo s to the players for each xed a. Since the equilibrium fee structure under incentive fees is the same as that which obtains under fulcrum fees when a 1, equilibrium levels of expected utility and expected fees in this case are given by 3.12 and 3.13, respectively. When a 1, equilibrium levels of expected utility and expected fees are given by Observe that in this case the equilibrium payo s to both the investor and the fund are independent o f a . Comparing the expected fees for the fund when a 1 to that which obtains when a 1 establishes that the former is strictly larger, and therefore, that: Proposition 3.4 In an incentive fee r e gime:
1. When a max 1, the optimal portfolio choice for the fund is a = a max . The equilibrium fee structure and payo s are the same as in the corresponding fulcrum fee c ase, and are given by C.7, 3.12 and 3.13, respectively.
2. When a max 1, any action a 1 is an optimal portfolio choice for the fund. The optimal fee structure is a pure p erformance f e e with b 1 = 0 and b 2 given by C.25 in Appendix C.3. The equilibrium levels of expected utility and expected f e es are given by 3.19 and 3.20, respectively.
Proof See Appendix C.4.
Comparison of the Equilibrium Outcomes
Having identi ed the equilibrium outcomes under both regimes, we turn now to a comparison of these outcomes. We employ three criteria: i the investor's expected utility in equilibrium, ii the fund's expected fees in equilibrium, and iii the standard deviation, or volatility," of the net-of-fees returns to the investor in equilibrium.
We h a v e already described closed-form expressions for the expected utility and expected fees in equilibirum under either regime for any xed a. W e n o w do the same for equilibrium volatilities. As above, let = 2 h + h l + 2 l . In a fulcrum fee regime, when a 1, equilibrium volatility is given by With these closed-form solutions in hand, we are in a position to prove the main result of this section: Proposition 3.5 If a max 1, then equilibrium outcomes under incentive fees are identical to those under fulcrum fees. If a max 1:
1. The investor's equilibrium expected utility is strictly higher in an incentive fee r e gime than in a fulcrum fee r e gime.
2. Equilibrium volatility of gross returns i.e., of the fund portfolio is never higher under an incentive-fee r e gime than under a fulcrum fee r e gime.
3. Provided a mild parameter restriction is satis ed:
a The fund's expected f e e is also strictly higher in an incentive fee r e gime. b The volatility of net-of-fees returns to the investor is strictly smaller under an incentive fee r e gime.
Remark The required restriction on parameter values is stated precisely in the proof of the proposition. The restriction is a very mild one, and is e ectively just a requirement that the ratio h = l not be too close to unity. Of course, if h = l = 1, then the benchmark portfolio would be dominated by the riskless asset, since it would then provide the same expected return at a higher volatility. Note that the investor is always better o under incentive fees whether or not this parameter restriction is met.
Proof See Appendix C.5. Tables 1 and 2 provide a numerical illustration of Propositions 3.1 3.5. We take a speci c parametrization of the benchmark returns, and present the equilibrium outcomes for various values of a ranging between a = 0 : 25 and a = 2 . Each table presents six quantities of interest: i the values of b 1 and b 2 in the equilibrium fee structure, ii the expected fee EF received by the fund, iii the amount o f w ealth x allocated to the fund, iv the expected net-of-fees returns EY to the investor, v the volatility Y of this return, and vi the investor's expected utility EU. 10 Since the equilibria under the two regimes coincide when a max 1, we focus in this paragraph on the case a max 1. The tables illustrate the Pareto improvement that takes place under incentive fees in this case. For the parameterizations used, the investor's utility is a little bit higher under incentive fees than under fulcrum fees; the fund's payo is substantially improved. For any xed a 1, the amount x invested in the fund is also larger under an incentive fee than under a fulcrum fee. Finally, the expected net-of-fees return to the investor is smaller under an incentive fee; but the volatility i s l o w er, su ciently lower, in fact, that the investor's overall welfare is improved.
Equilibrium when Fee Structure is Unrestricted
Several other fee structures than the fulcrum-and incentive-fee mechanisms m a y b e e n visaged. The most general of these is one in which the fund elects to charge a di erent fee in each state of the world, i.e., in which the choices of F h , F m , and F l are totally unrestricted. Such unrestricted fee structures often lead to unrealistically complex state-dependence in contracting problems. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile considering this case for completeness, and also to be able to relate the earlier outcomes to it. Table 3 presents the solutions obtained in the unrestricted case for the same parametrization as used in Tables 1 and 2 . These solutions were obtained using an optimization package.
As the table reveals, the unrestricted optimal fee structure involves positive fees in only a single state of the world, with zero fees in the other two states. In particular, base or guaranteed fees are not optimal in this case.
More interesting is the comparison with the restricted fee structures. When a 1, the unrestricted equilibrium fee structure di ers from the equilibrium fee structure under both the fulcrum-fee and incentive-fee regimes. However, when a 1, outcomes under the unrestricted fee coincide with those under incentive-fees. We examine the possible reasons for this in the next subsection.
An Intuitive Explanation of the Results
The results of this section may be understood from an intuitive standpoint without recourse to the speci c trinomial model we h a v e examined. Of course, such an informal explanation will necessarily be incomplete, but it serves to highlight the driving factors behind the model.
Consider rst of all the model in which fee structures are unrestricted. In this case, one would expect that the fees taken by the fund in equilibrium would be increasing|or, at least, non-decreasing|in the total returns r p on the fund portfolio. This would reduce the variance of net-of-fees returns to the risk-averse investor, improving risk-sharing and causing a larger amount t o b e i n v ested with the fund. Section 3.4 con rms this intuition in the trinomial model.
In the presence of benchmarking, however, the fees depend not only on the fund returns r p , but also on the di erence between r p and the benchmark returns r b . Since the two returns are related by r p = ar b + 1 , a , this di erence is given by 11 r p , r b = a , 1r b , 1
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Now, r p and r b are strictly monotonically related: as one increases, so does the other. However, as 3.24 shows, if a 1, the di erence r p ,r b decreases with an increase in r p . T h us, the performance adjustment component of the fees i.e., the term b 2 r p , r b also decreases as r p increases. This is obviously ine cient in view of the arguments of the previous paragraph, so it becomes optimal for the fund to simply set the term b 2 to zero. Thus, at fees result under benchmarking when a 1. Note that this argument holds for both fulcrum and incentive fees.
When a 1, however, 3.24 implies that the di erence between the returns also increases as r p increases. Thus, with a positive b 2 , the fund can achieve a fee structure qualitatively 11 It su ces for the intuitive arguments that follow that 3.24 hold in expectation. That is, the model of returns could be of the form r p = ar b + 1 , a + , where r b and are uncorrelated and has mean zero. similar to the unrestricted one. Under incentive fees, this process is further facilitated by the asymmetric structure of the performance-adjustment component; in the trinomial model of this section, in fact, an exact correspondence becomes possible between the unrestricted solution and the incentive fee solution. With fulcrum fees, however, the symmetric nature of the fulcrum limits the extent to which the gap may be narrowed, except in models where the unrestricted fee is itself symmetric around the benchmark the current model is evidently not one such. Hence, fulcrum fee outcomes are inferior to incentive fee outcomes when a 1, while both are inferior to the unrestricted outcome when a 1.
Introducing E ort into the Model
We n o w build on the model of the previous section by allowing for the possibility that, apart from the choice of portfolio, the fund can also a ect return characteristics by expending costly e ort. This e ort leads to information about the likely state of the world high medium, or low concerning the return on the benchmark portfolio. Based on this information, the fund chooses the appropriate portfolio mix. Greater e ort leads to more accurate information but at a higher cost.
The details of the framework we study are as follows. The prior distribution of the three states is as used in Section 3: that is, the benchmark portfolio returns are given by 1 + h ; with probability 1 = 3 1 ; with probability 1 = 3 1 , l ; with probability 1 = 3
If the fund takes the e ort level e 2 0; 1 , then with probability pe, it identi es which state of the world high, medium, or low will actually occur. With the complementary probability 1 , p e it receives no information at all, so the prior distribution is also the posterior distribution. Finally, expending an e ort of e has a cost to the fund of e. Throughout this section, we will presume that p and are given by pe = p e ; e = ke 2 ;
4.1 where k 0 i s a g i v en constant. Under 4.1, the functions p and are both increasing, re ecting the fact that higher e ort reveals more information but at a higher cost. Moreover, the the strict concavity o f p ensures that e ort has a declining marginal bene t, while the convexity o f implies an increasing marginal cost of e ort.
The order of moves is as follows. The rm announces i.e., precommits to a fee structure F and an e ort level e. Based on these, the investor decides on the amount x to be invested with the fund. Upon observing the outcome of its e ort decision, the fund then chooses a portfolio mix, and nal rewards are realized. As earlier, we assume that the fraction a of initial asset value that the fund invests in the risky asset must satisfy a 2 0; a max , where a max is a given constant. 12 This model is a stylized one, but it has a number of attractive features. It captures the fact that there are two possible inputs into returns generation: portfolio choice which could be passive and active management such as gathering information that could improve portfolio choice. In our model, the fund can choose to simply generate the benchmark returns by setting a = 1 and taking zero e ort. Alternatively, it could take positive e ort e 0, which w ould lead to valuable information for portfolio allocation a fraction e of the time. Indeed, under the speci cation 4.1, an e ort level of e = 1 w ould lead to perfect information that would enable the fund to tie or beat market returns all of the time although the cost of doing so could make this a suboptimal action.
Once again, we restrict attention to only fulcrum and incentive fee structures. Our aim is to obtain and compare equilibria under the two structures using the same criteria as used earlier: the equilibrium expected utility of the investor, the equilibrium expected fees received by the fund now measured net of the cost of e ort, and the volatility of equilibrium returns to the investor.
Solving this problem involves a backwards induction argument. We rst identify, for given values of the fee structure b 1 ; b 2 , the e ort level e, and investment in the fund x, the portfolio choice of the fund for each possible realization of the information event. Then, taking these choices and the fee structure and e ort level as given, we solve for the investment level that maximizes the investor's expected utility. Finally, taking into account the investor's reaction to di erent fee structures and e ort levels, we solve for the levels that maximize the fund's expected fees.
The large number of decision variables and the various non-linearities in the model make this a non-trival problem. The solution is, however, simpli ed by the following observations. If the rm receives the information that the high state is going to occur, then its optimal action is evidently to shift all its resources into the benchmark portfolio, so we will have a = a max in this case. If it receives information that the medium or low states will occur, then it is optimal to invest entirely in the riskless asset, so we will now h a v e a = 0. Finally, if it receives no information at all, then it is easy to see from the fund's risk-neutrality that a = a max is always an optimal choice under either fee structure.
Unfortunately, e v en with this simpli cation, the model remains too complex to solve i n closed form. We solved it numerically for a number of di erent parameter con gurations. The results for two of these are reported in Tables 4 and 5. The tables reveal that the important qualitiative results of our earlier model survive essentially intact:
1. Concerning the structure of equilibrium contracts: a When a max 1, the equilibrium fee contract under both fulcrum and incentive fees is a at fee without a performance adjustment component. b When a max 1, a positive performance-adjustment component arises in both cases.
Concerning the equilibrium outcomes:
a When a max 1, equilibrium outcomes under the two regimes coincide along all dimensions. b When a max 1, outcomes under an incentive fee structure Pareto-dominate those under a fulcrum fee structure.
Finally, for any xed a max , equilibrium payo s for both parties decline as the cost of e ort increases. In the limit, when e ort becomes in nitely costly, the fund never expends any e ort, so the optimal payo s are exactly those obtained in Section 3 with a = a max .
Our numerical analyses also revealed an interesting trade-o between leveraging and e ort levels. When a fund employs incentive fees, it is already protected from downside risk, so the bene ts from expending e ort accrue mostly from the increased upside it can derive from knowledge of the true state. This upside bene t is limited in turn by the extent of leveraging available to the fund i.e., by the size of a max . When a max is only slightly larger than unity, the upside bene t is restricted, so for some parameter values the fund simply takes no e ort at all. This is not the case under a fulcrum fee, where extra e ort not only increases the upside but also limits downside losses. Thus, for some parameter values involving low leveraging abilities, we found that the investor was slightly better o under fulcrum fees, though the fund remained signi cantly better o under incentive fees.
Introducing Additional Sources of Risk
A second possible criticism of the model of Section 3 is that under the strategies available to the fund, the return on the fund portfolio is always perfectly correlated with the return on the benchmark portfolio. In this section, we consider a generalization of the model that admits the possibility of imperfect correlation. We consider a four-state model with two risky securities and one riskless security. The riskless security will, as usual, be assumed to have a net return of zero. Letting 1 ; 2 denote the net expected returns on the two risky securities and 1 ; 2 their volatilities, the gross return on the two risky securities in the four states are assumed to be given by: Security Finally, the probabilities q i of the four states are taken to be q 1 = q 4 = 1 + 4 q 2 = q 3 = 1 , 4 where 2 ,1; 1. It is easily checked under this speci cation of returns and probabiltiies that the expected return and volatility of security i are, indeed, given by i and i ; and that is the correlation between the returns on the two securities. Throughout this section, we concentrate on a symmetric v ersion of this model where it is assumed that 1 = 2 = and 1 = 2 = . The correlation remains unrestricted. The benchmark portfolio is de ned to be an equally weighted portfolio of the two securities. Thus, denoting bỹ r 1 andr 2 the returns on the two securites, the benchmark returnsr b are given bỹ r b = 1 2 r 1 + r 2 :
Finally, it remains to specify the portfolio strategies available to the fund. Let a 1 and a 2 denote the fractions of initial asset value invested by the fund in each of the two risky securities, with the balance 1 , a 1 , a 2 denoting the fraction invested in the riskless asset.
We assume that a 1 and a 2 must be non-negative, and that there is a maximum leverage available to the fund, i.e., there is some a max 1 such that any feasible pair a 1 ; a 2 m ust satisfy 0 a 1 a 1 + a 2 a max :
Note that given any c hoice of a 1 ; a 2 , the returns e r p a on the fund portfolio are given by e r p a = a 1 r 1 + a 2 r 2 + 1 , a 1 , a 2 :
F ulcrum and incentive fee structures are de ned as in Section 3. Given any feasible choice of portfolio a 1 ; a 2 for the fund, and any speci c fee structure, a distribution is generated in the obvious way for the net-of-fees return Y received by the investor per dollar invested in the fund. Using the expectation EY and the variance V Y o f Y , 3.6 then de nes the optimal amount i n v ested in the fund as a function of the portfolio choice a 1 ; a 2 and the fee structure. Taking this dependence into account, the fund chooses a portfolio mix and parameters for its fee structure that maximize its expected fees. All of this is conceptually straightforward but notationally cumbersone, so we a v oid the details here.
The introduction of a second risky security makes this model signi cantly more complicated than the one studied in Section 3; it no longer looks amenable to analytical solution. We i n v estigated it numerically, therefore, for a wide variety of possible parameters. In solving for the equilibrium, we use a two-step procedure. We rst x a fraction y 2 0; a max o f initial asset value that may b e i n v ested in the two risky securities combined i.e., we assume that a faction 1 , y m ust be invested in the riskless asset. Then, we maximize expected fees subject to the constraint that a 1 + a 2 = y. Using these maxima, we nally identify the optimal value of y for the fund.
Our most important nding is that although the fund in this model may c hoose a portfolio that is imperfectly correlated with the benchmark, it never does so: for any given value of y, and under either fee regime, the values of a 1 ; a 2 that maximize the fund's payo s subject to the constraint a 1 + a 2 = y are always a 1 = a 2 = y=2. 13 Intuitively, this result appears driven by the investor's variance aversion. Under benchmarking, the investor's net-of-fees returns depend on two distributions: that of the fund portfolio r p and of the benchmark return r b . Since the investor is risk-averse, he reacts favorably to any ceteris paribus reduction in uncertainty. B y c hoosing weights so that the fund and benchmark portfolios are perfectly correlated, the two correlated sources of noise are e ectively reduced to a single source.
Under the choice of equal weights, the multiple risky securities model of this section reduces to a one risky security model analogous to the one studied in the previous section. Unsurprisingly, then, the welfare properties of the equilibria under the two regimes are very similar to those obtained in the previous section. Table 6 presents equilibrium values of all relevant quantities for a speci c parametrization of the problem. The table shows, in particular, that 1. When a max 1, a at fee with no performance component is arises as the equilibrium fee under both regimes. Thus, equilibrium outcomes coincide completely.
2. When a max 1, the incentive fee regime Pareto-dominates the fulcrum fee regime, providing higher payo s for both the fund and the investor. Volatility of net-of-fees returns are also strictly lower under incentive fees.
Thus, even under the richer set of portfolio strategies available to the fund, it continues to be the case that the investor is weakly and, if a max 1, strictly better o under incentive fees.
Conclusions
Existing analyses of mutual funds have mostly been conducted within a classical principal agent framework. In this paper, we propose an alternative model for the study of these institutions, and use this model to study the existing regulations that require fee structures used to compensate mutual fund advisers to be of the fulcrum" variety, i.e., that decrease in the same way for underperforming an index as they increase for outperforming it. We nd little justi cation for the legal restrictions. In particular, we nd that asymmetric incentive-fee" structures|in which the adviser receives a base fee plus a bonus for exceeding a benchmark index|Pareto-dominate fulcrum fees, providing a higher utility t o all participants with, in fact, a lower level of equilibrium volatility. These results contrast with those obtained using a partial equilibrium framework in which the investor's reactions are not explicitly modelled.
Our model also provides some insight i n to existing fee structures in the asset-management industry. In the mutual fund industry, the most commonly used fee structure observed in practice is a at fraction-of-funds" fee with no explicit performance component. In hedge funds, which are not subject to the fulcrum fee requirement and which also tend to use leveraged strategies, the most common fee found in practice is an incentive fee with a large performance component. These are exactly the structures that arise as equilibria in our model. In the absence of leveraging, we nd that the equilibrium fulcrum fee is always a at fee with no performance component. When incentive fees are allowed and leveraging is permitted, we nd that the equilibrium fee is an incentive fee with a large performance component.
A A Brief History of the Investment Advisers Act
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 lays out compensation strucutures that are impermissible for investment advisers. The act prohibits a registered investment adviser from receiving compensation on the basis of a share of capital gains in, or capital appreciation of, a client's account. In particular, performance-based compensation structures such as those which p a y a at fee plus a bonus for outperforming an index are disallowed.
The Act was prompted more by concerns about the inherent nature of such incentive fees," than any evidence of actual abuse. Nonetheless, the prohibition in the original act was not absolute. Incentive fees were allowed in contracts between investment advisers and investment companies including mutual funds, as long as the chosen basis of compensation was adequately disclosed to the shareholders.
In the 1960's, this situation was challenged by the SEC, which recommended that the prohibition on incentive-fee contracts be extended to cover investment company contracts also. The commission furnished Congress with the information that of 137 registered investment companies that then had fee arrangements based in some measure on performance, 48 allowed the investment adviser to earn a bonus for good performance without a penalty for bad performance, while a further 45 had arrangements in which the rewards for superior performance far outweighed the penalties for inferior performance. Although the commission did not present Congress with any actual evidence of abuse, Congress nevertheless accepted the commission's recommendation in 1970, and amended the 1940 Act to include investment company contracts also.
At the same time, however, Congress provided for one important exemption to the prohibition of performance-based fees. Contracts with registered investment companies were allowed to have compensation based on performance if they were of the fulcrum" variety, that is if mangerial compensation were computed symmetrically around a chosen benchmark, decreasing for underperforming the benchmark in the same way in which it increased for outperforming it.
Since 1970, there has been only one major change to the regulation of performance-based compensation. In 1985, the SEC allowed the unlimited use of performance-based fees in contracts in which the client had either i at least $500,000 under the adviser's management, or ii a net worth of at least $1,000,000. This amendment has not, however, a ected mutual funds in any important w a y , since for a mutual fund to qualify for the exemption, every single shareholder in the fund would have to meet one of the two speci ed criteria.
B Existing Patterns of Fees
The single most prominent and perhaps most intriguing fact concerning compensation structures in the mutual fund industry is the overwhelming popularity of fraction of funds" fees, in which the investment adviser receives as compensation a xed fraction of the total funds under management. A recent article in the New York Times reported that out of 5,400 stock and bond funds, only 75 or 1.4 use fulcrum fees that depend non-trivially on performance. 14 Although small, the list does include some prominent names, such a s Fidelity's Magellan Fund, and Vanguard's Windsor Fund.
Within each of these two categories, a number of variants may be found in the mutual fund industry. In the use of fraction-of-funds fees, for instance, some funds tend to use a xed percentage of assets under management, while others tend to use a sliding scale, with the percentage declining as the assets under management increases.
A t ypical fulcrum fee in the industry takes on the form of a base fee plus a performance adjustment" for exceeding or falling short of a chosen benchmark. For equity funds, the benchmark is usually, though not always, the S&P 500 index. In most cases, a cap and oor are also placed on the fulcrum fee, that is, the performance adjustment component o f the total fee is limited to some maximum amount often 20 basis points. A variant o n these themes is o ered by V anguard's Windsor fund in which the nal fee is calculated as the base fee times an adjustment factor, where the adjustment factor varies from 0.50 to 1.50 depending on the fund's performance vis-a-vis the S&P 500 index. Finally, i t i s n o t uncommon for funds using a fulcrum fee to base the performance adjustment component not just on peformance over the last year, but over a longer period say, the preceding three years.
C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
For ease of reference, we begin with a statement of the problem. To this end, recall that the lower bound on fees in any state is zero. Taking ensures that the investment with the fund will never be a positive amount, ruling this out as a candidate solution.
The second candidate C.6 may also be ruled out as a solution. If we use this expression to substitute for b 1 in terms of b 2 in the fees, and then maximize expected fees ignoring the constraints, the only value of b 2 that meets the rst-order conditions implies an in nite value for b 1 . T h us, no unconstrained solutions exist.
We turn to constrained solutions. There are four constraints that could hold with equality in a solution: i b 1 = 0, ii b 2 = 0, iii the oor of zero could hold for fees in some state, and iv the ceiling of 2b 1 could hold for fees in some states. It helps in the sequel to consider the cases a 1 and a 1 separately.
C.1.1 The Case a 1
When a 1, it is the case that in state h the fund portfolio underperforms the benchmark, while in state l the fund portfolio outperforms the benchmark. This means for any nonnegative v alues of b 1 and b 2 , the fees are e ectively given by F h = maxf0; b 1 1 + a h + b 2 a , 1 h g F m = 1 , b 1 F l = minf2b 1 1 , a l ; b 1 1 , a l , b 2 a , 1 l g To identify the optimal choice of b 1 ; b 2 , we proceed in several steps, identifying at each step the set of candidate solutions that arise when only a subset of the constraints holds with equality. Comparing the expected fees in the candidate solutions then yields the optimal choice of b 1 ; b 2 . We rst examine the candidate solutions that arise when either b 1 = 0 or b 2 = 0 . Then, we will identify the candidate solutions that arise if the lower-bound constraint o n F h holds with equality. Third, we will repeat this exercise when the upperbound constraint o n F l holds with equality. It is easily checked that all the relevant constraints are met when b 1 is given by C.7 and b 2 = 0 . T h us, the expected fees under the choice C.7 are a candidate solution to the fund's optimization problem. Letting = 2 h + h l + 2 l , these fees are given by EF = 3 + a h , l h , l 2 24 : C.8
The case b 1 = 0 , b 2 0 is easily eliminated from consideration: in this case, fees must violate the non-negativity condition in state h and the upper bound of 2b 1 in state l.
We turn now to the case where the lower bound on F h holds with equality. I f F h = 0 , then
We can use this expression to obtain the entire fee structure in terms of b 2 . T h us, we can identify the investor's optimal action as a function solely of b 2 , and thereby the fund's expected fees. Taking the rst-order condition with respect to b 2 of these expected fees results in only one non-negative v alue for b 2 . This value of b 2 , and the corresponding value of b 1 are:
b 2 = ,a1 + a h h , l 5 h + l a , 1 :
It is easy to check that under these values of b 1 and b 2 , the non-negativity requirements as well as the upper-bound condition for F l are satis ed. Thus, C.9 C.10 are also candidate solutions to the optimization problem. As the last step in the proof, we compare the expected fees under the three candidate solutions. Consider rst C.8 and C.11. Eliminating the common terms, it is seen that the former expression is larger than the latter only if C.1.2 The case a 1 When a 1, the fund portfolio always does worse than the benchmark portfolio in the state l and always does better in the state h. Therefore, the lower bound of zero can have a n impact only in state l and the higher bound of 2b 1 can have an impact only in state h; the e ective constrained fee structure is given by 
C.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
When a 1, we h a v e seen that the expected fee is given by C.8, which is clearly increasing in a. T h us, a = a max is the optimal action if a max 1. If a 1, the expected fee is given by C.22 which is also increasing in a. Moreover, we h a v e shown that for any xed a 1, C.22 is larger than C.8. Since C.8 is increasing in a, it is the case that for any a 1, the maximum expected fee C.22 under a dominates the expected fee C.8 for any a 1.
It is immediate now that the optimal action for any a max 1 i s a = a max , completing the proof.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
The maximization problem here is the same as was outlined at the top of section C.1, with the di erence being that the fee structure in e ect is an incentive fee structure. Thus, the non-negativity constraints on the realized fees, or the corresponding upper-bounds, play n o role here. The only constraints facing the fund in its choice of parameters for the fees are that b 1 and b 2 must be non-negative. The proof provided in section C.1 concerning the absence of unconstrained solutions evidently continues to apply to this case also. Thus, only two forms of constrained solutions Consider rst the case where b 1 0 and b 2 = 0. In this case, solving for the optimal value of b 1 evidently results in the same solution as in the corresponding fulcrum fee case: the optimal b 1 is given by C.7 and the expected fee is given by C.8. Now consider b 1 = 0. Solving for the expected fee in terms of b 2 using the procedure we have described many times above, and then taking the rst-order conditions with respect to b 2 results in only a single non- Both numerator and denominator are positive; since k 1, this ratio is an increasing function of a, and reaches its minimum when a = 0. When a = 0, a plot of the ratio reveals that it is strictly increasing in k and greater than unity whenever k 1. Thus, the ratio is also greater than unity for a 0 when k 1. It follows that the optimal incentive fee structure when a 1 i s t o h a v e b 1 0 and b 2 = 0, with b 1 given by C.7.
C.3.2 The Case a 1
When a 1, the fund portfolio outperforms the benchmark in state h and underperforms it in state l. Therefore, for any c hoice of b 1 ; b 2 , the fund's fees are given by The rst of these expressions is positive, but the second can be shown to be negative, so we discard it as a possible solution.
To complete the proof, it remains to compare the expected fees C.27 to the expected fees C.8 under the two solutions. Once again, we de ne k = h = l and d = 1 + k + k 2 , and take the ratio of C.28 to C.8. Cancelling common terms, this ratio is seen to be ratio = 4dd , p 3d p 3d , 3 k , 1 2 3 + ka , 1 l 2d + k p 3d
The ratio is decreasing in a and reaches its minimum value at the maximum feasible value for a of 1= l . A plot of the ratio shows that even when a = 1 = l , the ratio is strictly greater than unity whenever k 1. It follows that the optimal structure of incentive fees when a 1 has b 1 = 0 and b 2 0, with the optimal b 2 given by C.25, and the expected fees under this optimal choice given by C.27.
C.3.3 The Case a = 1
As with fulcrum fees, the case a = 1 is easily handled. As with condition C.33, this condition also holds in most" reasonable cases, failing only when k is too close to unity and a l is large. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.5.
D A Risk-Averse Fund
Throughout this paper, we h a v e assumed that the fund is risk-neutral. This assumption was made in part for analytical tractability, since it enabled us to obtain closed-form solutions in Section 3. However, it turns out that, from a qualititative standpoint, the assumption is not very important: the same features of the equilibria highlighted in Section 3 also obtained when the fund's utility function was taken to be ux = x f for f 2 0; 1 . We present some examples of the new equilibria for this version of the model of Section 3. The results presented here were obtained by solving the problem numerically.
So x any v alue of f 2 0; 1 . As in Section 3, we found that whenever a max 1, the equilibrium fee under both a fulcrum fee regime and an incentive fee regime is a at fee. Thus, equilibrium outcomes coincide completely in this case. Table 7 presents numerical values of equilibrium outcomes under the two regimes for two v alues of and three values of a max 1. As the table shows, the qualitative nature of these gures is the same as that which obtained in Section 3, with the outcomes under an incentive fee regime dominating those under a fulcrum fee regime on all counts. The only additional feature of interest is that as the value of f falls, the di erence in outcomes between the regimes narrows. This table presents the equilibrium levels under both fee regimes of six quantities for the three security model of Section 5. The six quantities are: i the parameters b 1 and b 2 of the equilibrium fee, ii the amount x invested in the fund, iii the net-of-fees expected returns EY to the investor, iv the volatility of these returns Y , v the fund's expected fees EF, and vi the investor's expected utility EU. The fraction 1 , y of initial asset value invested in the riskless asset is taken as xed in this exercise; the table includes the optimal fractions a 1 and a 2 of initial asset value invested in each of the two risky assets. Seven values are used for y ranging from 0.25 to 2.00. The investor's variance aversion parameter is xed at = 2. The return parameters on the two risky securities are xed at 1 = 2 = 0 : 1 and 1 = 2 = 0 : 2. The correlation between returns is xed at = 0 : 30. 
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